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NON-CUMULATIVE ZONING ORDINANCE UPHELD
People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton
Grove, 16 Il1. 2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959)
The Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, amended its zoning ordin-
ance to prohibit residential use in districts zoned for commercial use. The
Circuit Court, Cook County, granted a writ of mandamus requiring the
Village to issue building permits for four townhouses to be built in a
district zoned for commercial use only. On an appeal of this decision by
the Village, plaintiff (appellee) attacked the zoning ordinance on two
grounds: (1) that it violated the due process clauses of both the state and
federal constitutions,' being an unreasonable interference with plaintiff's
use of his private property; and (2) that it was, in any event, inapplicable
here in that plaintiff held a vested property interest prior to the enact-
ment of the exclusive zoning provision.2 The Illinois Supreme Court held
that plaintiff had a vested interest in the property at the time of the
amendment of the ordinance and thus affirmed the issuance of the writ.'
While not the basis of this decision, the court declared that the ordinance
was not an unconstitutional use of the police power. It is this dictum
which raises the question noted herein.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, ILL. CONST. art 2, § 2.
2Plaintiff had expended certain sums for plans, plot plans, commitment for a
mortgage loan, $1,630 for permits and contractor's permits once issued but later
revoked by the village, and $200 deposit for sidewalks, all in reliance on the orig-
inal zoning ordinance which classified plaintiff's property to include certain
dwellings. The ordinance was thereafter amended to exclude residential usage.
3 The basic rule is that mere contemplated use, unrealized at the effective
date of the zoning regulation, is not sufficient to become a non-conforming use.
101 C.J.S. Zoning § 186 (1958). However, where there has been a substantial
change in position (either through actual construction or incurring of non-con-
struction liabilities) the conduct qualifies as a permissive non-conforming use.
101 C.J.S. Zoning § 187 (1958). As to how far a project must go before leaving
the area of mere contemplation into becoming a substantial change of position
there is mixed judicial opinion. However, there does seem to be general agree-
ment that insignificant expenditures either in construction or planning will not
suffice, while active, continued construction seems to be clearly acceptable. See
Annot., 138 A.L.R. 500 (1942). The general rule seems to be that whatever ex-
penditure is involved must occur after the construction permit has been received,
with most cases arising out of a subsequent revocation of the permit in conform-
ance with amended zoning ordinances.
Here, the Illinois court appears to be unusually lenient in that it not only con-
siders the investment in building plans and loan commitments in an unspecified
amount, together with $1830 in permit costs as a substantial change of position;
but, it also takes into consideration expenditures made before issuance of permit
in reliance on the probability of its issuance. 157 N.E.2d at 37. See Fifteen
Fifty North State Building Corp. v. City of Chicago, 15 Il1. 2d 408, 155 N.E.2d 97
(1958) ; Deer Park Civic Ass'n. v. City of Chicago, 347 I1. App. 346, 106 N.E.2d
823 (1952). While the court seems to regard the failure of the building commission
to tender back the permit fees paid as some evidence of a substantial change in
position, it is apparent that this is but "makeweight" in the absence of any speci-
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The court's justification for upholding the ordinance reflects a re-
cent trend in the law of zoning. Traditionally, zoning plans have been
cumulative in effect, progressing from the "highest use" to the "lowest
use", each classification including all higher uses. 4 For example, a city
might zone one area for exclusively residential use, a second area might
include both residences and light commercial use (such as drug stores and
grocery markets), while a third would include residential, light commercial
and heavy industrial use. The underlying philosophy seemed to be that
the public health, welfare, safety and morals could best be protected in
the priority afforded private dwelling usage and necessary supporting mar-
ket facilities. Increased industrial growth and the corresponding urban-
ization movement have created social and economic problems not previ-
ously confronted.' Areas once residential gave way to industrial expansion.
The consequent rise of slums created municipal problems in public health
and safety of children.
Recognizing a need for correcting this situation without further
restricting industrial development, many cities adopted the non-cumula-
tive approach to zoning, permitting exclusion of residential structures (a
"higher" use) from commercial and industrial areas ("lower" use).' This
method is designed to provide for industrial expansion space, minimum
traffic congestion for the free flow of products and supplies, while at the
same time affording better protection for public health and welfare by
permitting a greater degree of cleanliness, safety for children and an op-
portunity to preserve the beauty of the community.
Such ordinances have only recently been at issue in the courts, the
first case being Corthouts v. Town of Newington,7 decided in 1953. In
that case an ordinance similar to the one in the principal case was held
invalid as it applied to the plaintiff's land, because there was no evidence
of any current plans for industrial use of the land nor any for a reason-
able time in the future, while plaintiff's land was presently desirable and
in demand for residential purposes.' The court there, however, did not
close the door on non-cumulative zoning, pointing out that it was con-
fled amount of investment on plot plans, etc. (that there 'were such unspecified
costs incurred was stipulated by the parties). 157 N.E.2d at 37. Thus it would
seem that even if the permit costs were refunded or tendered back the court felt
that there was still substantial expenditure here and that such conduct under similar
circumstances would not be sufficient to defeat a claim of vested interest in Illinois.
4 See BAKER, LEGAL AsPacrs OF ZONING 66 (1927) ; BASSErr, ZONING 63 (1940) ;
Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1954). The term "highest use" ordinarily refers to
private residential usage, while "lowest use" normally would be heavy industry.
o See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6See RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 58 (2d ed. 1951); WILLIAMS, CITY
PLANNING AND ZONING 277 (1922).
7 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953), noted in 52 MIcH. L. REV. 925-26 (1954).
8 The municipality's case was further weakened by the fact that school build-
ings, motels, club rooms, stores, etc., were permitted inconsistent with the ex-
clusion of residences.
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ceivable that such an ordinance, under different circumstances could be a
reasonable protection of public health and welfare.' Since Corthouts there
have been eight reported cases deciding the issue (excluding the principal
case)," ° four of which held the ordinance in question invalid," but all
holding that non-cumulative zoning is not unconstitutional per se.
Here, the Illinois court met the question squarely and unani-
mously ruled the ordinance reasonable. The court pointed out that zoning
is properly within the police power of a state 2 and that such power can
be delegated to a municipality.'" The only limitation on the municipality's
exercise of that power and the exclusion thereunder of residence from
industrial districts is that the exclusion "bear a substantial relationship to
the preservation of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."' 4
Ordinarily zoning ordinances are constitutionally attacked as being
unreasonable exercises of police powers, with such epithets as "spot zoning"
thrown in where an ordinance seems undesirable to a land owner.' 5 The
test of the exercise of that power as to reasonableness is by determining
whether a zoning scheme is part of a "comprehensive plan" dedicated to
the further development of the community.16 The United States Supreme
9 "It is easy to conceive a statute where the erection and occupation of dwell-
ing houses on land in an industrial area in close proximity to manufactories us-
ing highly inflammable or explosive materials or giving off noxious odors or per-
nicious gases would have a direct relation to the public health, safety and wel-
fare and justify prohibiting legislation against the use of such land for residence
purposes." Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. at 288, 99 A.2d at 114.
10 Roney v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County, 138 Cal. App.2d
740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956) (upheld); Comer v. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 471,
70 N.W.2d 813 (1955); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131
A.2d 1 (1957) (decided together with Depew v. Township of Hillsborough);
Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955); Newark
Milk & Cream Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 47 N.J. Super. 306,
135 A.2d 682 (1957) (upheld) ; Hinna v. Board of Appeals, 11 Misc.2d 349, 170
N.Y.S.2d 12 (1957) (upheld); Logan v. Bickel, 11 Pa. Dist. & Co.2d 405, 43 Del.
Co. 272 (1956) (upheld).
11 In Katobimar Realty, Comer, Kozesnik, and Depew, supra note 10, the
ordinances were invalidated for other reasons, but the non-cumulative nature of
them was upheld as to plaintiff's property.
12 157 N.E.2d at 36.
13 The court found such a delegation in broad powers given over to munici-
palities by the Revised Cities and Villages Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, c. 24, pars.
72-1 to 73-12. Paragraph 73-1 (4) of that act provides municipal power "to
classify, regulate and restrict . . . the location of buildings designed for specified
industrial, business, residential and other uses." Paragraph 73-1 (7) empowers a
municipality "to prohibit uses, buildings or structures incompatible with the char-
acter of such districts." In the former the court saw municipal powers to zone
regarding industrial or residential usages, while it found the power to exclude
either one from the other in the latter provision. 157 N.E.2d at 36.
14 Ibid.
15 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, supra note 5.
16 Ibid.
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Court has given the Congress wide discretion in this area, 7 while the
state courts have been more inclined to question the zoning plans enacted
by state legislatures and their administrative delegates.
From the reported decisions it is apparent that there is an important
difference in attitude with which the courts view the narrower question
of non-cumulative zoning. The Corthouts case'" represents the viewpoint
that, while the concept of restricting residences from industrial areas seems
feasible where there is direct danger to the residential owners through
hazardous industrial operations, that is the only situation in which it is
acceptable. In Comer v. Dearborn,'9 the court reflected a similar view in
holding that where the area was not now "industrial" and there were al-
ready many houses and shops, a non-cumulative ordinance was arbitrary
and unreasonable in view of the fact that there was no evidence of the
area becoming industrially populated in the near future. The Katobimar
Realty case2" held that a shopping center was not incompatible with light
manufacturing and that an ordinance restricting such use from the in-
dustrial zone was capricious, unreasonable and arbitrary, bearing no sub-
stantial relationship to public welfare. These cases show an emphasis on
residential usage as opposed to industrial usage. There seems to be little
concern under this view for city planning (as evidenced by such state-
ments as "unreasonable in this situation," "not yet industrial," "no sub-
stantial relation to public welfare") rather, the tendency here is toward
the traditional favoritism for residential use of property. 2 1
The Illinois court indicates a more realistic attitude from which to
view the concept of non-cumulative zoning. This court has recognized
the changes in our society and the complex problems facing cities today,
and has seen a twofold value of the non-cumulative zoning device as a
means of alleviating some of those problems. This type zoning helps re-
lieve the city of the danger of industrial operations in an area including
many residences by reducing commercial traffic where children are at
17 "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.
It is not for us to reappraise them." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
18 .Supra note 7.
1o Supra note 10.
2 OSupra note 10.
21 "In one or two ordinances, residences are altogether excluded from the
heavy manufacturing districts, as is sometimes done in Germany. If the district
is kept small, this may be altogether advantageous; although it would seem to
involve the creation of a neighboring district, devoted to housing, which could be
made industrial later, if expansion of the original industrial district became
necessary. If, however, the industrial district is large enough for all expansion, it
would be a hardship and an economic waste to keep owners of land from using
it (until needed for manufacturing) for the only purposes for which it would be
utilized." WILLIAMS, CTvy PLANNING AND ZONING 277 (1922). See also 32 N.Y.U.
L. REv.
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play, avoiding dirty, unattractive neighborhoods resulting from industrial
smoke and gases, and averting other unpleasant and delinquency-breed-
ing hazards caused by lack of adequate facilities for playgrounds, schools
and parks. With regard to this type problem, the court points out that
".. . it is not unreasonable for a legislative body to assume that separa-
tion of the areas (industry and residential) would tend in the long run
to insure a better and a more economical use of municipal services .. .
and 'better use of street facilities." 22 Non-cumulative zoning is also valu-
able to the burdened city from another viewpoint. A city needs industry
and must provide an attractive climate in order to allow existing in-
dustries to prosper and to inject new business and new blood into the com-
munity. Just as a homeowner is interested in maintaining a healthy at-
mosphere for his family and an attractive homesite, so is an industry in-
terested in protecting its plant site, and insuring an efficient and produc-
tive operation. Admittedly, heavy industrial traffic is a hazard to resi-
dential usage; however, it is also true that heavy residential traffic or
serious restrictions on industrial traffic hamper the efficient flow of in-
dustrial supplies and finished products. Moreover, industry is aware of the
undesirable tendency for the growth of slum areas on its periphery to the
detriment of both plant site attractiveness and employee welfare. 23 It is
generally recognized that encirclement of an industrial area by taverns,
gambling spots and similar employee traps has a harmful effect on a com-
pany's work force and therefore is no more desirable from industry's
standpoint than it would be for an expensive residential neighborhood.
Judge House, speaking for the unanimous Illinois court, dearly recognizes
this proposition:
The general welfare of the public may be enhanced if industry
and commerce are provided with a favorable climate. The sale
of a few lots at important points in a district may make indus-
trial or commercial expansion impossible or prohibitively ex-
pensive. To protect the residents in the district, traffic may be
slowed down unduly and thus detract from the efficiency of
production and trade. In final analysis, it seems clear that in-
dustry and commerce are also necessary and desirable and that
a proper environment for them will promote the general wel-
fare of the public.2
4
In Roney v. Board of Superzusors 25 the court refused to permit con-
struction of a housing project in an area zoned by the city for heavy in-
dustrial purposes, pointing out that the land was not shown to be un-
22 157 N.E.2d at 36.
23 Industry is not only interested in space from a production standpoint, but
in this age of modern construction, it wants an attractive industrial location too.
For many years the city of Cleveland has sponsored a competition for the most
attractive industrial grounds in the area. Annually industries strive for this hon-
or and proudly display plaques given in recognition of their achievements.
24 157 N.E.2d at 36.
25 Supra note 10.
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usable for industrial purposes within a reasonable time. The Kozesnik
case,26 though the ordinance was invalid for other reasons, refused to
accept arguments made as to the unreasonableness of the non-cumulative
concept. Newark Milk 7 and the Logan case2 clearly support the position
taken by the Illinois court. These cases all emphasize the necessity for con-
sideration of the needs of industry in a sound zoning plan. Courts main-
taining this attitude seem to recognize that a complex, industrial com-
munity no longer should concentrate on "higher" or "lower" uses; but,
rather must face the problem as it now stands-that these are but "dif-
ferent" uses to be treated with due respect for the needs of each.29
It is essential that our economy be permitted to grow and our social
communities to flourish along with it. Non-cumulative zoning is a device
particularly helpful in this area to city planners, charged with the task of
planning future expansion for a community.30 It is, in fact, the very
essence of flexible comprehensive planning. That its indiscriminate use is
dangerous, is readily admitted. The Illinois court recognized this hazard
in a caveat proposing caution in this area "because of the existing admix-
ture of residential, commercial and industrial uses."'" Bearing in mind this
note of caution, it can be reasonably concluded, however, that in view of
the changing society in which we live, the modern concept of non-cumula-
tive zoning will gain strength and eventually become a universally ac-
cepted principle of city planning.
Lester S. Lash
26 "Experience has satisfied many that, for example, homes are no more ap-
propriate in an industrial district, than industry in a residential one." 24 N.J.
154 at 169, 131 A.2d 1 at 9.
27 Supra note 10.
28 "If in those areas where industry is permitted to locate, other types of con-
struction are permitted to encroach, industrial expansion would be stifled." 11 Pa.
Dist. & Co. 2d. 405 at 410.
2D In the Roney case, supra note 10, the court said, "... it cannot be held that
there is anything arbitrary or unreasonable per se in the plan of zoning to pre-
vent the so-called 'higher' uses from invading a 'lower' use area . . . . In fact, the
term 'higher' as applied to residential uses ... is not an accurate one; for, al-
though the use of property for homes is 'higher' in the sense that commercial and
industrial uses exist for the purpose of serving family life, the better these second-
ary uses can accomplish their purposes, the better is the primary use of the prop-
erty served." 138 Cal. App. at 746, 292 P.2d at 532.
30 The recent location of a multi-million dollar Western Electric Company
plant in Columbus, Ohio, has been in large part attributed to the fact that the city
had zoned a large area (in which the plant was ultimately located) exclusively
for industrial use. Were it not for this factor Columbus might well have lost the
plant. Discussion of planning effects can be found in an appendix to the N.Y.U. L.
REV. survey cited supra note 6.
31 157 N.E.2d at 36.
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